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THE “INNOCENCE” OF BIAS
Osamudia James*
BIASED: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT SHAPES WHAT
WE SEE, THINK, AND DO. By Jennifer L . Eberhardt. New York: Vi-
king. 2019. Pp. 340. Cloth, $28; paper, $18.
INTRODUCTION
It’s simple to explain, but not so easy to see or to rectify .
—Eberhardt, p. 279.
If multiculturalism was central to the progressive zeitgeist of the 1990s,
unconscious bias was the same to the progressive zeitgeist of the early 2000s.
Ushered in by the field of implicit social cognition,1 implicit or unconscious
bias refers to the attitudes or stereotypes that affect our actions and decisions
in an unconscious manner.2 As applied to the problem of discrimination in
the United States,3 bias refers to favorable or unfavorable attitudes and be-
liefs individuals can harbor regarding ingroups and outgroups. Social science
literature suggests that the magnitude of implicit bias working against mem-
bers of outgroups and disfavored racial minorities is pervasive, continually
accumulating, and a precursor to discriminatory behavior.4
Recognition of unconscious bias quickly migrated from scholarly and
academic circles to popular culture. Project Implicit, for example, provides
free online access to Implicit Association Tests that allow people to assess
their unconscious attitudes toward a number of social groups, including Af-
rican Americans and European Americans.5 In addition to using data col-
lected through the site to document biases, Project Implicit has introduced
an entire generation of laypersons to the likelihood that they, too, harbor
* Professor of Law & Dean’s Distinguished Scholar, University of Miami School of
Law.
1. The field of implicit social cognition focuses on unconscious mental processes that
dictate behavior. Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and
the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 467–68 (2010).
2. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Founda-
tions, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 951 (2006).
3. Bias is not necessarily negative, and the term refers to “response bias,” or the “dis-
placement of people’s responses along a continuum of possible judgments.” Id . at 950.
4 . Id . at 955–62 (citing to meta-analysis from the Implicit Association Test).
5. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/ [https://perma.cc/E6MU-
LRC8].
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unconscious biases.6 Understanding implicit bias has deeply impacted legal
discourse, prompting waves of scholarship addressing how implicit bias op-
erates in the criminal justice system.7 It is not uncommon for organizations
to require bias training for employees, or for colleges and universities to pro-
vide bias training for faculty and students on campus. Societal understand-
ing of implicit bias is now so commonplace that presidential candidates are
expected to raise the issue in debates.8
Perhaps in no sphere has the concept of implicit bias featured more
prominently than in movements for racial justice. The Black Lives Matter
project was launched in part to combat implicit bias and anti-Black racism.9
And advocates for social justice are well versed in literature analyzing how
implicit biases disadvantage and harm Black people across various social
spheres, including medicine, education, housing markets, labor pools, and
policing. When twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was killed by Ohio police, popu-
lar discourse regarding his killing included speculation that the police offic-
ers’ perception of Rice as a twenty-year-old man was the manifestation of
implicit bias.10
6 . See Stephanie Bornstein, Reckless Discrimination, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1055, 1095
(2017) (noting that the work of researchers through Project Implicit has been covered by major
news sources and was recently compiled into a book summarizing its data collection). The pro-
ject, however, has not been without critique. For more on the debate regarding the tests’ stabil-
ity and predictive validity, see Kristin A. Lane, Mahzarin R. Banaji, Brian A. Nosek & Anthony
G. Greenwald, Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV, in IMPLICIT
MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 59 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007); Bertram
Gawronski, Mike Morrison, Curtis E. Phills & Silvia Galdi, Temporal Stability of Implicit and
Explicit Measures: A Longitudinal analysis, 43 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 300 (2017);
Anthony G. Greenwald, T. Andrew Poehlman, Eric Luis Uhlmann & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Un-
derstanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: III . Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 97
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 17 (2009); and Eric Luis Uhlmann, Victoria L. Brescoll & Eliza-
beth Levy Paluck, Are Members of Low Status Groups Perceived as Bad, or Badly Off? Egalitari-
an Negative Associations and Automatic Prejudice, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 491
(2006).
7 . See, e .g ., Justin D. Levinson, Huajian Cai & Danielle Young, Guilty by Implicit Racial
Bias: The Guilty/Not Guilty Implicit Association Test, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 187, 204 (2010)
(finding that study participants implicitly associated Black with guilty and white with
nonguilty); Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J.F. 406,
410–13 (2017) (examining what systemic implicit bias could mean for Eighth Amendment
analysis of the death penalty and juvenile life without parole); L. Song Richardson, Police Effi-
ciency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1144 (2012) (arguing that the “reasonable
suspicion” legal test is particularly vulnerable to implicit bias).
8 . See, e .g ., Mark Hensch, Clinton: We Must Fight ‘Implicit Bias,’ HILL (Sept. 26, 2016,
10:15 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/297939-clinton-i-think-
implicit-bias-is-a-problem-for-everyone [https://perma.cc/T24Z-6993].
9 . Our Co-Founders, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/our-co-
founders/ [https://perma.cc/9LCY-3BWT].
10 . See, e .g ., German Lopez, Police Thought 12-Year-Old Tamir Rice Was 20 when They
Shot Him . This Isn’t Uncommon, VOX (Nov. 26, 2014, 6:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2014/11
/26/7297265/tamir-rice-age-police [https://perma.cc/668T-4BBZ]; see also REBECCA EPSTEIN,
April 2021] The “Innocence” of Bias 1347
Into this moment enters Dr. Jennifer Eberhardt’s new book, Biased: Un-
covering the Hidden Prejudice that Shapes What We See, Think, and Do.11 In
the book, Dr. Eberhardt endeavors to both add to the vast literature docu-
menting implicit bias and lend social and cultural context for the studies so
that readers might better understand the material and psychic consequences
of unconscious biases. Drawing largely from her own research as a social
psychologist and Stanford professor, work for which she was awarded a
MacArthur genius grant,12 Eberhardt details the studies that she and other
researchers conduct about implicit biases and its consequences. Peppered
throughout are Eberhardt’s personal anecdotes that help bring to life the
studies that implicate parenting, policing, education, incarceration, and even
migration. The book’s normative conclusion, presented in the third section,
is that unconscious bias is not only a burden for people limited by the auto-
matic and unconscious mental shortcuts on which bias trades. Rather, it also
corrodes entire communities, alienating teachers from students, police offic-
ers from civilians, and residents from their neighbors. Individuals, however,
have the capacity to respond to that corrosion with courage. And in the mere
act of personal reflection about bias lies the power to create change.
Eberhardt’s work arrived almost two years after the “Unite the Right”
rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, exposed very explicit racial bias that many
Americans believed was a thing of the past. Thus, some readers might find
Eberhardt’s exposition on implicit or unconscious bias less urgent than, say,
a reader on the rise of violent white nationalists. And yet, in Eberhardt’s
deep dive into the mental processes that produce racial bias lie keys to un-
derstanding the sort of dehumanization of the other that paves the path to
domestic terrorism.13
For these insights, essential for anyone committed to cultivating a more
egalitarian society, Eberhardt’s work in Biased has justifiably received praise.
Moreover, the book’s reminder that people can each harness their commit-
ment to equality is both assuring and empowering. In a world where we are
assaulted daily with discouraging examples of implicit and explicit racial dis-
crimination, Eberhardt’s call to individual work is an antidote to despair.14
JAMILIA J. BLAKE & THALIA GONZÁLEZ, GIRLHOOD INTERRUPTED: THE ERASURE OF BLACK
GIRLS’ CHILDHOOD (2017).
11. Dr. Jennifer Eberhardt is a Professor of Psychology, Stanford University.
12 . Jennifer L . Eberhardt, MACARTHUR FOUND. (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www
.macfound.org/fellows/913/ [https://perma.cc/CU4V-TG9N].
13 . See Editorial, We Have a White Nationalist Terrorist Problem, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/opinion/mass-shootings-domestic-terrorism
.html [https://perma.cc/XQ9Z-RM54].
14. “What can I do?” is a question often posed by whites hoping to affirmatively engage
in antibias work. For example, in August 2016, a white male caller contacted C-SPAN to ask
Heather McGhee, Demos Action president, how to overcome his fears and prejudices about
Black people. Caller Admits Racism and Is Gently Advised, C-SPAN (Aug. 22, 2016),
https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4618001/user-clip-caller-admits-racism-gently-advised. The
video has been viewed over eight million times. Jessica Nordell, Is This How Discrimination
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Individual responses, however, to biases that are baked into American struc-
tures are insufficient for substantive and enduring change to America’s racial
climate. Thus, readers of Eberhardt’s exposition on unconscious bias would
benefit from understanding the cultural and legal context against which an
understanding of unconscious bias operates, and the structural solutions that
Eberhardt’s work on unconscious bias should necessarily prompt.
Eberhardt is not a lawyer, nor was her goal in writing Biased to provide a
thorough accounting of the legal architecture of bias. Nevertheless, narra-
tives surrounding the reach and scope of unconscious bias are potentially
dangerous ones when unaccompanied by critiques of the inadequacies in our
legal system’s response to racial discrimination. The solution is not to pre-
tend that unconscious bias doesn’t exist; Eberhardt has capably illustrated
that it does. Rather, the solution is to contextualize that narrative, using the
contextualization both as an illustration of problems with our antidiscrimi-
nation regime and as a guide to remedies that might be implemented.
This Review proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of Bi-
ased, assessing its strengths and contributions to our collective understand-
ing of unconscious bias. Part II contends that although Biased powerfully
and thoroughly distills the brain science behind bias, a cultural and legal
commitment to white innocence—and to understanding racism as a person-
to-person problem divorced from larger societal power dynamics—can ren-
der engagement with unconscious bias counterproductive. This is a problem
Eberhardt amplifies by presenting bias as an individual phenomenon, equal-
ly pernicious no matter the race of the offender. Part III considers the likeli-
hood that Eberhardt’s proposed solutions will address hidden prejudice in
ways that appreciably ameliorate racial subordination and closes with juris-
prudential and structural changes that focus less on eradicating unconscious
or intentional bias, and more on drastically limiting their impact.
I. BIASED
Eberhardt’s work is comprehensive, deftly weaving together synopses of
some of the most insightful cognitive science about race to illustrate the
sheer pervasiveness of unconscious bias. Not content, however, to merely
summarize experiments, Eberhardt contextualizes the science, serving at
turns as autobiographer, historian, and investigative journalist.
The result is an engaging and unintimidating read that Eberhardt orga-
nized into three major parts: “What Meets the Eye,” summarizing the sci-
ence behind how the human brain recognizes and categorizes other humans
on the basis of race (pp. 11–43); “Where We Find Ourselves,” detailing the
associations between Blackness and criminality in the criminal justice system
(pp. 47–152); and “The Way Out,” addressing how race impacts societal out-
comes in the context of housing and communities, parenting, and education
Ends?, ATLANTIC (May 7, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/05
/unconscious-bias-training/525405/ [https://perma.cc/XGF3-5LQW].
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(pp. 155–293). This third section also suggests strategies for short-circuiting
the automatic mental connections through which unconscious bias runs.
Biased makes many contributions to the literature on unconscious bias,
only three of which I will address. The first is in the gift of a thorough yet ef-
ficient compilation of the most compelling psychological research and data
regarding the cognitive science of racial bias. Given the cultural cachet of
unconscious bias, one would not be faulted for believing that a multitude of
this kind of work already exists, but that belief would be incorrect. Rather,
what exists are best-selling books that address racial bias among a broader
survey of various types of bias (e.g., gender, class) or that address brain sci-
ence more generally.15 Here, thankfully, is a book that drills down into the
concept of unconscious bias in the context of race, explaining how the brain
processes race, as well as how that processing manifests in everyday interac-
tions (p. 6). Eberhardt brings to this work not only her expertise as one of
the country’s foremost social psychologists, but also her credibility from hav-
ing worked with tech companies and police departments to implement poli-
cies that can counter unconscious bias.
That Eberhardt does all of this through storytelling is an added benefit.
A chapter on how the brain perceives race begins with her own story of be-
ing unable to distinguish between the faces of her white classmates upon
moving from a Black school to a white school when she turned twelve
(pp. 11–13). A section on the promise and perils of integration is punctuated
by her son’s school experience with racially coded rules about hair (pp. 205–
09). A third section, still, is made real by her account of how racial profiling
landed her in the back of a police car, handcuffed (pp. 97–101). In using nar-
rative, Eberhardt joins the trend of social scientists who use stories to explain
the fruits of their research. Eberhardt, however, is also writing in the tradi-
tion of critical race theorists who promote the unique and authoritative voic-
es of people of color, voices forged in the fire that is the experience of race
and racism in America.16 Eberhardt’s personal experiences certainly bring
heat to Biased, daring readers to walk away unsinged.
A final contribution is that Eberhardt’s presentation avoids judgment
and accusations, choosing instead to describe unconscious bias as a phe-
nomenon to which no one, Black or white, is immune. Although, as will be
described below, this framing makes invisible the architecture of American
racism, Eberhardt’s tone may lure readers who might otherwise be inclined
to tune out on account of pluralism anxiety.17 Indeed, one online book re-
15 . See, e .g ., MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT (2013);
MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK (2005); CAROLINE CRIADO PEREZ, INVISIBLE WOMEN: DATA
BIAS IN A WORLD DESIGNED FOR MEN (2019).
16. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY 11 (3d ed. 2017).
17. As coined by Kenji Yoshino, “pluralism anxiety” refers to the social backlash to in-
creased recognition and protection for identity groups in the United States. See Kenji Yoshino,
The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751 (2011).
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view noted with relief that there is “[n]o need to fear being scolded in this
understanding, revealing look into the insidiousness of partiality.”18
II. BIGGER THAN JUST BIAS
One is hard-pressed to find fault with Biased in terms of the science. Ra-
ther, the problem is in the cultural and legal context into which Biased en-
ters, a context that aggravates rather than ameliorates racial inequality, and
that is insufficiently acknowledged in the book.
A. Racism Without Racists
Social narratives play a significant role in public life, allowing groups of
people to unify around a set of shared experiences and beliefs.19 When dom-
inant societal groups use narratives to explain social phenomena, explana-
tions of inequality tend to highlight individual shortcomings rather than
subordination or bias.20 In the context of race, America’s cultural commit-
ment is to occasionally and tepidly recognize racism while rarely locating
any racists.21 Narratives surrounding racial inequality follow this pattern,
characterizing whites as “innocent victims” of policies meant to correct for
racial bias.
The white-innocence narrative has featured repeatedly and prominently
in Supreme Court cases addressing affirmative action, from Regents of the
University of California v . Bakke in 1978,22 to Wygant v . Jackson Board of
Education in 1986,23 to Grutter v . Bollinger in 2003.24 In these cases assessing
the constitutionality of race-conscious remedial measures, the Court alter-
nately characterizes whites as innocent individuals at whose expense racial
classifications were being used to aid victimized groups,25 as innocent people
against whom discriminatory legal remedies were working,26 and as innocent




19. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 917, 924
(2009).
20 . Id . at 924–25.
21 . See ROBIN DIANGELO, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE WHITE?: DEVELOPING WHITE
RACIAL LITERACY 193–94 (rev. ed. 2016); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race:
Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1845–52 (1994) (using the con-
text of housing segregation and discrimination to illustrate that racism can be produced by law
and policy, despite a lack of intentional racism or legally sanctioned racial discrimination).
22. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
23. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
24. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
25 . Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
26 . Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
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persons in need of protection from race-based government action.27 The im-
age of innocent white victims draws power from the implicit contrast to per-
sons of color who unfairly benefit from affirmative action, buttressed by
stereotypes regarding lazy and undeserving minorities.28 Against this narra-
tive, lawsuits alleging reverse racism—claims that whites are racially discrim-
inated against—capture the nation’s attention,29 accompanied by increases in
the percentage of Americans who believe that whites are subject to more dis-
crimination than nonwhites.30
Equality doctrine further enshrines the white-innocence narrative.
American antidiscrimination laws and norms are grounded in beliefs that
discrimination is the product of conscious and intentional mental processes
and behavior.31 Thus, to be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment,
claims of discrimination must be supported by proof of explicit intent to dis-
criminate,32 even when the impact of unintentional discrimination on targets
is the same. Worse still, that proof must be extreme and egregious, in keep-
27 . Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
28. Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 314–15
(1990).
29 . See, e .g ., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013); see also Adam Liptak,
Race and College Admissions, Facing a New Test by Justices, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/us/supreme-court-to-hear-case-on-affirmative-
action.html [https://perma.cc/Q4ZU-78S4] (discussing the Supreme Court’s then-upcoming
decision in Fisher).
30 . See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum
Game that They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI. 215, 216 (2011) (describing the re-
sults of an empirical study in which a nationally representative sample of whites believed that
there has been more antiwhite than anti-Black racial discrimination in the last decade). More
recently, according to a 2017 survey conducted by Harvard’s School of Public Health, the Rob-
ert Wood Johnson Foundation, and National Public Radio, 55 percent of white Americans be-
lieve discrimination against whites is a problem today. P. 270.
31 . See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of
“Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1064–67, 1078–79 (2006) (suggesting a new mod-
el of affirmative action informed by behavioral realism and its account of implicit bias).
32. Nor is defendant knowledge of a disparate impact on racial groups stemming from
state conduct sufficient to find intent. Rather, if a defendant adopts a facially neutral policy
despite a racially disparate impact of which they were aware, intent is still not established.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238–42 (1976). The de jure intent requirement has signifi-
cantly curbed the reach of equal protection in cases of racial discrimination. Not only are most
decisionmakers likely to avoid explicitly expressing discriminatory intent in ways that can be
observed and presented as proof of intent, but racial disparities are often the product of uncon-
scious or implicit bias, or even adopted in aim of other goals despite anticipated disparate im-
pact. Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinksy, Essay, The Once and Future Equal Protection
Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1076–83 (2011) (describing the structural aspects of equal
protection that limit the doctrine’s reach). Discounting the negative impact of policies on
communities of color is ultimately a form of racial subordination.
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ing with how rarely our laws locate actual racists, even when racial exclusion
or marginalization is apparent.33
The Court has also embraced a “colorblind” approach to equal protec-
tion, which finds a potential constitutional violation whenever the state dif-
ferentiates between similarly situated groups, regardless of whether state
policy is intended to entrench or counter white supremacy.34 Together with
intent doctrine, these anti-antidiscrimination commitments35 have preserved
facially neutral laws with a disparate impact on minority groups, while pro-
hibiting race-conscious state policies designed to address racial inequality.
By responding to only “intentional” discrimination, the Court ensures that
whites who are complicit in either unintentional or unconscious discrimina-
tion will always be innocent victims unfairly shouldering the burden of race-
conscious programs meant to address that discrimination. This legal com-
mitment to white innocence is only furthered by the Court’s insistence that
equal protection rights are guaranteed to individuals and not to groups,36
and in Court decisions refusing to approve race-conscious remedies for soci-
etal discrimination.37
The Court’s resistance to societal discrimination notwithstanding, racial
subordination does, in fact, operate in larger social and political construc-
tion: through race-neutral law and policy with disparate impacts; in inter-
connected and mutually reinforcing public policies that more often subject
people of color to state mechanisms of punishment;38 and to political pat-
33 . See, e .g ., Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 127, 135–38
(2017) (detailing the lengths to which the Supreme Court goes to avoid acknowledging inten-
tional acts of racial discrimination in education and voting rights cases).
34 . See, e .g ., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747
(2007) (striking down a school-assignment plan that used student racial identity to integrate
public schools and counter the impact of race and residential segregation on access to particu-
larly sought-after schools).
35. Jed Rubenfeld, Essay, The Anti-antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141,
1142–43 (2002).
36 . See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“[T]he ‘rights
created by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the
individual. The rights established are personal rights.’ ” (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
22 (1948))).
37 . See, e .g ., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (“No one doubts
that there has been serious racial discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing
discriminatory legal remedies that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is in-
sufficient and overexpansive.”); see also Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and
the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1458–61 (2005) (citing
Brief for Respondents Kimberly James et al. at 40–42, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)
(No. 02-241)) (detailing the arguments of the social justice intervenors in Grutter, whose briefs
explained how university reliance on admissions criteria that disproportionately disadvantaged
people of color was the linchpin in a racial caste system).
38 . See, e .g ., Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of
Black Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1491–92 (2012) (analyzing how the U.S. prison and fos-
ter-care systems work together to make Black mothers vulnerable to state mechanisms of sur-
veillance and punishment); George Lipsitz, “In an Avalanche Every Snowflake Pleads Not
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terns or racial exclusion that self-perpetuate indefinitely if not explicitly
countered.39
Professor Ibram X. Kendi labels these phenomena as “racist policies”
that work with racist ideas to produce and “normalize[] racial inequities,”40
and they, rather than just unconscious or implicit bias, do the real work of
racial subordination.41 Addressing individual instances of unconscious bias
regarding Black laborers in the South at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, for example, would have been no match for large-scale and race-neutral
New Deal regulations that excluded agricultural and domestic workers from
Social Security benefits.42 This exclusion triggered a disinvestment in Black
field hands, sharecroppers, maids, and nannies, ultimately to severe and neg-
ative intergenerational-wealth implications.43 Racial subordination is also
found in the failure to institute protective policy, as was the case in McCles-
key v . Kemp.44 There, the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection chal-
lenge to Georgia’s death penalty, despite statistical analysis showing racial
bias subjected Blacks to the death penalty more often when they were guilty
Guilty”: The Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration and Impediments to Women’s Fair
Housing Rights, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1746, 1753–65 (2012) (analyzing “how housing and em-
ployment discrimination [work together] to make black women and Latinas particularly vul-
nerable to surveillance, arrest, and incarceration”).
39 . See Ford, supra note 21, at 1845–52 (using the context of housing segregation and
discrimination to illustrate how racial segregation can operate in the absence of intentional
racism or legally sanctioned racial discrimination).
40. IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 17–18 (2019).
Racist policies have been described by other terms: “institutional racism,” “structural
racism,” and “systemic racism,” . . . . [But] “[r]acist policy” says exactly what the prob-
lem is and where the problem is . . . . “Racist policy” also cuts to the core of racism bet-
ter than “racial discrimination.” . . . When someone discriminates against a person in a
racial group, they are carrying out a policy or taking advantage of the lack of a protec-
tive policy. . . . Focusing on “racial discrimination” takes our eyes off the central agents
of racism: racist policy and racist policymakers, or what I call racist power.
Id . at 18–19.
41 . Id .
42. Trymaine Lee, A Vast Wealth Gap, Driven by Segregation, Redlining, Evictions and
Exclusion, Separates Black and White America, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/racial-wealth-gap.html [https://perma.cc
/8AKL-U7UW].
43 . Id . (detailing the exclusion of Black agricultural and domestic workers from Roose-
velt’s New Deal policies that helped build a solid middle class in the United States); see also
Brian Thompson, The Racial Wealth Gap: Addressing America’s Most Pressing Epidemic,
FORBES (Feb. 18, 2018, 12:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brianthompson1/2018/02/18
/the-racial-wealth-gap-addressing-americas-most-pressing-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/8ZMB
-GEED].
44. 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (upholding the Georgia death penalty despite conclusive evi-
dence showing that even after accounting for nonracial variables, defendants charged with kill-
ing white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence than defendants charged
with killing Black victims).
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of killing whites.45 In Georgia, racist ideas about the culpability and rehabili-
tation of Blacks combined with facially race-neutral death penalty policies to
produce racial disparities in capital punishment. Bias, both conscious and
unconscious, has the most meaning and impact when backed by state power
wielded by dominant groups.46
B. Unconscious?
It is into this social and legal reality that Biased lands. Likely because it is
understood as out of one’s individual control, and thus less blameworthy,
engagement with the idea of unconscious or implicit bias has been wide-
spread, even as engagement with subordinating law and policy remains thin.
In the appeal of unconscious bias, however, lies its defect. That is, its wide-
spread palatability reflects an American cultural commitment to white inno-
cence. Eberhardt admits that in an attempt to ensure individuals don’t shut
down, trainers reassure trainees that everyone is vulnerable to unconscious
bias (pp. 281–82). But the problem is deeper than overly optimistic trainers.
Just as law and culture can find no white perpetrators of racial discrimina-
tion, unconscious bias finds no whites with a unique obligation to account
for their behavior.
Despite the law’s insistence on white innocence, social science literature
documents the ways in which whites use race as a heuristic for everyday de-
cisionmaking. Economic policies, for example, that the public perceives as
benefitting Blacks, even if not explicitly race targeted, become politically
vulnerable.47 Moreover, study after study repeatedly documents that when
Americans are able to infer race, racial discrimination follows. Resumes
headlined by white-sounding names receive 50 percent more callbacks for
job interviews.48 African Americans with Black-sounding names receive only
half the responses of those with white-sounding names regarding requests
45 . McClesky, 481 U.S. at 297–99 (acknowledging that although racial bias dictated the
statistical disparity, it did not amount to an equal protection violation).
46. Woody Doane, Rethinking Whiteness Studies, in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING
SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM 3, 7 (Ashley “Woody” Doane & Eduardo Bonilla-Silva eds., 2003)
(explaining that “whiteness is grounded in the dynamics of dominant group status,” with
whites successfully using “political and cultural hegemony to shape the racial order and racial
understandings of American society”).
47. Maria Krysan, Prejudice, Politics, and Public Opinion: Understanding the Sources of
Racial Policy Attitudes, 26 ANN. REV. SOCIO. 135, 160 (2000) (citing MARTIN GILENS, WHY
AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY
(1999)) (finding that when policies like tax breaks for job creation in poor areas or welfare pro-
gramming become racialized, they face the same public-opinion obstacles as explicitly race-
conscious policies).
48. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable
Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON.
REV. 991, 997–1006 (2004) (finding that white-sounding names received 50 percent more
callbacks than Black-sounding names, that higher-quality resumes elicit about 30 percent more
callbacks for white-sounding names whereas Black-sounding names elicit a smaller increase,
and that the amount of discrimination is uniform across occupations and industries).
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for legal representation.49 Law firm partners found more errors in legal
memos authored by associates with Black-sounding names than in the exact
same memos authored by associates with white-sounding names.50 In the
context of school selection, parents use race as a heuristic when choosing
schools, even after controlling for academic performance and educational
programming.51 When purchasing a home, house hunters evaluate homes
sold by Black families as in need of more features to be attractive, as less well
maintained, as worth nearly $22,000 less, and as located in areas with inferi-
or shopping, schooling, and city services (pp. 160–61).
Nor can these decisions even be accurately characterized as strictly un-
conscious. Studies find that despite expressing a preference for integrated
schools, white parents nevertheless eschew research regarding programming
and academic fit in favor of an assessment of the number of other whites
who attend.52 Social scientists find that whites conduct housing searches in
white communities, while Blacks conduct searches in neighborhoods with a
variety of racial compositions.53 Further, during the home-buying process,
white agents further use racially coded language and racial stereotypes to
give clients advice and talk about neighborhoods.54 The mental processes of
white Americans might be automatic, but the decision to act on those pro-
cesses—or to refrain from controlling for them—is not. And therein lies a
49. Brian Libgober, Getting a Lawyer While Black: A Field Experiment, 24 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 53 (2020) (finding racial discrimination in obtaining legal services, with no evi-
dence supporting expectations of statistical discrimination theory, or the idea that lawyers are
responding not to race but to economically relevant signals correlated with race).
50. ARIN N. REEVES, WRITTEN IN BLACK & WHITE: EXPLORING CONFIRMATION BIAS IN
RACIALIZED PERCEPTIONS OF WRITING SKILLS (2014), http://nextions.com/wp-conten
t/uploads/2017/05/written-in-black-and-white-yellow-paper-series.pdf [https://perma.cc
/U9ZH-KXE2].
51. Susan L. DeJarnatt, School Choice and the (Ir)rational Parent, 15 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 1, 17–19 (2008) (summarizing study finding that even after controlling for
educational programming and academic performance, parents use race as a heuristic when
choosing schools).
52 . See, e .g ., ERIC TORRES & RICHARD WEISSBOURD, DO PARENTS REALLY WANT
SCHOOL INTEGRATION? (2020), https://mcc.gse.harvard.edu/s/Do-Parents-Really-Want-
School-Integration-2020-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q9F-PHWS] (finding that “many
White, advantaged parents appear to determine school quality by how many other White, ad-
vantaged parents send their child to [the] school”); Helen F. Ladd & Mavzuna Turaeva, Paren-
tal Preferences for Charter Schools in North Carolina: Implications for Racial Segregation and
Isolation (Annenberg Inst. at Brown Univ., EdWorkingPaper No. 20-195, 2020),
https://www.edworkingpapers.com/sites/default/files/ai20-195.pdf [https://perma.cc/348L-
WSJ6] (finding that white families were more drawn to schools where white students made up
the majority of the student body than Black families were drawn to schools where Black stu-
dents were in the majority).
53 . See, e .g ., Maria Krysan, Does Race Matter in the Search for Housing?: An Exploratory
Study of Search Strategies, Experiences, and Locations, 37 SOC. SCI. RSCH. 581, 594–97 (2008).
54. Elizabeth Korver-Glenn, Compounding Inequalities: How Racial Stereotypes and
Discrimination Accumulate Across the Stages of Housing Exchange, 83 AM. SOCIO. REV. 627,
636–43 (2018).
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less obvious problem with the focus on unconscious bias: the intellectual and
ideological drift it has prompted. The energy and focus put into engaging
unconscious bias not only obscures explicit bias.55 Rather, it has also made
more tolerable, under cover of the “unconscious bias” label, behavior that
was formerly, and properly, considered odious.
C. Power
Power differentials must also be acknowledged when engaging uncon-
scious bias. Perhaps hoping to avoid alienating anyone from these difficult
but necessary conversations, Eberhardt presents examples of Blacks and
whites who are equally guilty of unconscious racial bias (pp. 11–13, 19, 61,
68). The status differentials, however, that bias creates can actually change
the impacts of unconscious bias. Racism refers to cultural, social, and politi-
cal phenomena that maintain and perpetuate power among favored groups
of people, including normalized racial inequalities.56 In the United States,
racism favors white people, although not all whites benefit from racism
equally.57 This does not mean that people of color cannot engage in racist
behavior or harbor racist attitudes. To the contrary, people of color in posi-
tions of power, from policymakers to politicians, from business executives to
judicial appointees, all have opportunities to advance or oppose the racist
policies that perpetuate racial inequality. It does mean, however, that race
impacts outcomes not only because of the explicit or implicit biases individ-
uals harbor but also because of the power dynamics that give the manifesta-
tion of those biases meaning and reach. It also means that in a system
constructed to maintain white supremacy—even if only among the most
55. Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505 (2018) (identifying and criti-
cizing legal arguments against the consideration of explicit bias).
56. KENDI, supra note 40, at 18. “Race creates new forms of power: the power to catego-
rize and judge, elevate and downgrade, include and exclude. Race makers use that power to
process distinct individuals, ethnicities, and nationalities into monolithic races.” Id . at 38; Edu-
ardo Bonilla-Silva, “New Racism,” Color-Blind Racism, and the Future of Whiteness in America,
in WHITE OUT: THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACISM, supra note 46, at 271, 271 (ex-
plaining that whiteness is embodied racial power used to give the dominant racial group sys-
tematic privileges while denying the same to nonwhites).
57. Camille Gear Rich, Marginal Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497, 1505–06 (2010) (de-
scribing “marginal whites” as “individuals who, because they possess some nonracial, socially
stigmatized identity characteristic, have . . . limited access to white privilege”); Khiara M.
Bridges, Race, Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White Privilege and the Criminalization of
Opioid Use During Pregnancy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 770 (2020) (using the criminalization of opi-
oid use during pregnancy to illustrate how white privilege can coexist with disadvantage, the
architecture for which can be constructed against a backdrop of anti-Black racism); KENDI,
supra note 40, at 131–32 (noting that white supremacists support policies that benefit racist
power against the interests of the majority of white people, including the refusal to
acknowledge climate change, which is impacting spaces white people inhabit; the opposition to
affirmative action, which has primarily benefited white women; and the opposition to
Obamacare even though 43 percent of those who gained life insurance as a result of the pro-
gram were white).
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powerful whites—unconscious bias has differing consequences depending
on who is doing the biased thinking, and who the targets of the biased think-
ing are.
That members of all races are vulnerable to unconscious biases is made
clear throughout Biased. What is not explicitly acknowledged is that racial
bias operates within a social hierarchy designed to place whites at the top,
Blacks at the bottom, and other people of color at various places in be-
tween.58 The book’s introduction, for example, opens with two detailed sto-
ries of Black people profiling other Black people, despite the reference later
in the book to studies finding that whites engage in anti-Black bias at a high-
er rate than Blacks (pp. 3–5, 61). In a society where the white imagination
often dictates the factors on which profiling is based,59 detailed vignettes il-
lustrating how Black people profile each other avoids contextualizing bias
against power.
Similarly, Chapter One focuses on the challenges of cross-racial identifi-
cation, presenting as a case study the Black author’s childhood difficulty in
discerning white faces (pp. 11–13). Psychologists have found, however, that
whites have a harder time assessing emotion on the faces of Black people
than they do other white people, a problem that Blacks are less likely to
have.60 What does an inability, then, to distinguish among the faces of people
in different racial groups mean in a context where a particular group is con-
sistently in power? In a school where the curriculum probably centers white
people, and white cultural and social norms are typically well represented,
misrecognition of white children is likely to land as amusing at best and an
annoyance at worst. But for Black children in majority-white schools or
58 . See Paul Gowder, Racial Classifications and Ascriptive Injury, 92 WASH. U. L. REV.
325, 328 (2014) (describing a racial hierarchy in the United States in which Blacks are at the
bottom of the hierarchy and are, thus, the hierarchy’s starkest victims).
59. Elijah Anderson writes:
For the larger society, from the nightly news and media reports of rampant black-on-
black crime and at times from close observation of black people in public, images of the
black ghetto loom large. Here, the ghetto becomes intensely more iconic, symbolized as
a distressed place to which blacks have been relegated to live apart from the larger socie-
ty, thereby encouraging a universally low opinion of blacks as a racial category . . . . [The
ghetto serves] as a touchstone for prejudice, a profound source of stereotypes, and a ra-
tionalization for discrimination against black people in general. . . . When the anony-
mous black person enters the white space, others there immediately try to make sense of
him or her . . . . In the absence of routine social contact between blacks and whites, ste-
reotypes can rule perceptions, creating a situation that estranges blacks. In these cir-
cumstances, almost any unknown black person can experience social distance . . . .
Elijah Anderson, “The White Space,” 1 SOCIO. RACE & ETHNICITY 10, 13 (2015).
60. Justin P. Friesen et al., Perceiving Happiness in an Intergroup Context: The Role of
Race and Attention to the Eyes in Differentiating Between True and False Smiles, 116 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 375, 381, 387–88 (2019) (finding that due to their higher social
status, whites are less likely to make eye contact, and are thus less skilled at reading social cues
and emotions on the faces of individuals from minority groups).
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schools shaped by second-generation segregation,61 facial misrecognition
takes on deeper, more pernicious meaning, reinforcing a climate where that
child may experience racial marginalization and social invisibility62 as a daily
occurrence. The point is not that Blacks are incapable of cross-racial misrec-
ognition but that an implied equivalency between Black and white facial mis-
recognition dangerously elides the dynamics of white supremacy that
animate unconscious racial bias in the United States. Against the backdrop
of those dynamics, unconscious bias acted on by Black people regarding
whites is circumscribed in both its symbolic and material reach.63
III. UNCOVER AND CONTROL
Eberhardt explains that addressing the problem of unconscious bias
does not necessarily warrant training; the value of training is hard to quanti-
fy, undercutting rigorous evaluation of the programs (pp. 278–80, 285). Fur-
ther, to the extent the programs are evaluated, outcomes on the effectiveness
of “diversity” or unconscious-bias training (UBT) are mixed and limited. A
meta-analysis of the effects of diversity training, for example, found an effect
on reactions to training and cognitive learning, but a smaller effect on be-
havioral and attitudinal/affective learning.64 That is, trainees reported posi-
tive reactions to training and increased awareness about cultural-diversity
issues, but more modest changes in the development of trainee skills or
trainee attitudes about diversity and self-efficacy.65 Moreover, behavioral and
61. While first-generation segregation refers to the racial segregation within a school
district, second-generation segregation refers to “the racially correlated allocation of educa-
tional opportunities within schools,” typically through curricular grouping or tracking. Roslyn
Arlin Mickelson, The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence from
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1525 (2003).
62. In the context of discipline, however, Black children are hypervisible. As such, they
are overrepresented in public-school suspensions and corporal punishment, with schools more
likely to adopted extremely punitive disciplinary policies and less likely to use restorative tech-
niques as the percentage of enrolled Black students increases. These relationships operate in-
dependent of crime salience, teacher training, or economic status. Theresa Glennon, Race,
Education, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1240; Kelly Welch
& Allison Ann Payne, Racial Threat and Punitive School Discipline, 57 SOC. PROBS. 25, 35–41
(2010).
63. Charles Lawrence, an original architect of legal theories regarding unconscious bias,
has made similar claims, arguing that when cognitive theories called racial bias normal, they
refer to the normalcy of categorization. That does not mean, however, that the content with
which our cognitive categories are filled is predetermined. In fact, white supremacy provides
the content, and should be “the central concern of our justice project.” Charles Lawrence III,
Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of “The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection,” 40 CONN. L. REV. 931, 961–62 (2008).
64. Katerina Bezrukova, Chester S. Spell, Jamie L. Perry & Karen A. Jehn, A Meta-
analytical Integration of over 40 Years of Research on Diversity Training Evaluation, 142 PSYCH.
BULL. 1227, 1239 (2016).
65 . Id . at 1229, 1239.
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attitudinal changes decayed over time.66 Other research has found that alt-
hough UBT training is useful for raising awareness, and can be effective for
decreasing unconscious bias, it is unlikely to eliminate it, and that the evi-
dence for UBT’s ability to change behavior is limited.67 Further, to the extent
that UBT suggests that stereotypes and biases are unchangeable, UBT can
backfire.68 Eberhardt further notes that the trainings often serve as mere sig-
naling device or moral credential (pp. 279, 282).
Given the limited potential of training, Eberhardt goes beyond training
to present several solutions meant to interrupt the mental circuitry that
prompts humans to automatically exclude and dehumanize on the basis of
race. Instead, she suggests monitoring, as assessment and accountability for
decisions impacted by bias can produce sound judgments (p. 286). Eber-
hardt also suggests that opportunities for intense relationships across racial,
religious, or ethnic boundaries can undo the automatic mental associations
on which bias trades (pp. 287–89). Finally, she refers to timing and stand-
ards. Unconscious bias is often triggered under conditions shaped by speed
and ambiguity (pp. 285–86). If individuals and institutions can more often
make decisions liberated from time constraints and subjective standards, in-
stances of bias tend to decrease.
Some of these suggestions are limited in their capacity to effect change.
The potential of monitoring, for example, is unclear. Policymakers in New
York City were impervious to data showing that stop and frisk was not cor-
related to a reduction in crime, continuing to defend a policy that sanctioned
racial profiling of Black and Latino men.69 Further, although police depart-
ments across the country are increasingly adopting body cameras intended
to influence officer behavior, early research about the efficacy of cameras is
mixed at best, with several studies suggesting that the cameras reduce neither
66 . Id . at 1242. The positive effects of diversity training were greater when complement-
ed by other diversity initiatives and targeted to address both awareness and skills development.
Id . at 1244; see also Edward H. Chang, Katherine L. Milkman, Dena M. Gromet, Robert W.
Rebele, Cade Massey, Angela L. Duckworth & Adam M. Grant, The Mixed Effects of Online
Diversity Training, 116 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCIS. 7778, 7781 (2019) (concluding that one-off
diversity trainings commonplace in organizations do not effectively address bias in the work-
place).
67 . See, e .g ., Chang et al., supra note 66, at 7778.
68. DOYIN ATEWOLOGUN, TINU CORNISH & FATIMA TRESH, EQUAL. & HUM. RTS.
COMM’N, UNCONSCIOUS BIAS TRAINING: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE FOR
EFFECTIVENESS 19–22 (2018), https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files
/research-report-113-unconcious-bais-training-an-assessment-of-the-evidence-for-
effectiveness-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SXZ-X7TV].
69 . See JM Rieger, It ‘Saved Countless Lives’: How Mike Bloomberg Defended Stop-and-




1360 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:1345
instances of officer force nor citizen complaints about excessive force.70
Moreover, it is still the case that even perception of the officer–civilian inter-
actions “objectively” caught on video can be subjective and impacted by
race,71 as the video-recorded deaths of Eric Garner and Philando Castile at
the hands of police suggests.72 That policymakers, police chiefs, and jurors
are disproportionately white only underscores the likelihood that power can
undercut monitoring.
Relational solutions are also limited in their potential to address bias. As
an initial matter, legal precedents that stymie attempts to better integrate
public schools all but ensure that racial segregation and isolation will remain
the order of the day in American society.73 Thus, the restorative potential of
cross-racial relationships as a solution is undercut before they are even un-
derway among children. Further, relational solutions only reinforce faulty
beliefs about the interpersonal nature of bias.
To be sure, interpersonal racial harms not immediately derivative of
structural racism can be injurious to individuals. Moreover, it is also in these
70. Cynthia Lum, Megan Stoltz, Christopher S. Koper & J. Amber Scherer, Research on
Body-Worn Cameras: What We Know, What We Need to Know, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 93, 110–11 (2019) (concluding that although officers and citizens are generally support-
ive of body cameras, they have not had statistically significant or consistent effects on most
measures of officer and citizen behavior or citizens’ views of police); Amanda Ripley & Timo-
thy Williams, Body Cameras Have Little Effect on Police Behavior, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/police-body-camera-study.html [https://
perma.cc/VAZ2-QMG3] (summarizing the results of a rigorous eighteen-month study involv-
ing more than 2,000 police officers in Washington). But see p. 298 (reporting that after the
Oakland Police Department adopted body cameras in 2010, both citizen complaints and police
use of force declined).
71 . See, e .g ., Julie Bosman, Mitch Smith & Michael Wines, Jurors Find Video Isn’t
Providing 20/20 Vision in Police Shootings, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/06/25/us/police-shootings-trials-video-body-cam.html [https://perma.cc/
XRL6-GQTE] (reporting that video from body cameras has repeatedly failed to persuade juries
of police misconduct).
72. Justin Hansford, Body Cameras Won’t Stop Police Brutality . Eric Garner Is Only One
of Several Reasons Why, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014, 2:02 PM), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/posteverything/wp/2014/12/04/body-cameras-wont-stop-police-brutality-eric-garner-is-
only-one-of-several-reasons-why/ [https://perma.cc/BG7Z-ZA6C]; Osamudia James, Police
Video Won’t Deliver Justice . Philando Castile’s Case Proved It ., WASH. POST (June 22, 2017,
11:17 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/06/22/police-
video-wont-deliver-justice-philando-castiles-case-proved-it/ [https://perma.cc/42SS-L69J].
73. GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG WITH JONGYEON EE & JOHN KUSCERA, CIV.
RTS. PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE
2, 10 (2014), https://www.civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60-
051814.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8L7-F3PH] (concluding that Black students in the South are
less likely to attend a school that is majority white than about fifty years ago); Alvin Chang, The
Data Proves that School Segregation Is Getting Worse, VOX (Mar. 5, 2018, 1:50 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2018/3/5/17080218/school-segregation-getting-worse-data [https://
perma.cc/V3DE-KFDZ] (explaining that although the United States is racially distributing stu-
dents about as well as the country did a few decades ago, the most vulnerable students are in-
creasingly isolated).
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interpersonal engagements that racial hierarchies are reproduced.74 Never-
theless, a key harm of racial bias lies in the racist policies and institutional
practices that produce racial inequalities—inequalities that can continue
even if every individual was magically cured of racial bias.75 Relational solu-
tions, however, reinforce entrenched but flawed cultural and legal commit-
ments to understanding racism exclusively as a series of interpersonal slights
or abuses, rather than as social and political patterns of disfavor that produce
psychic and material consequences across societal spheres. The heavy em-
phasis in Biased on relational solutions at the same time that the book en-
gages the broader systems of policing, education, and housing
problematically conflates the problem of race between people and the prob-
lem of race within institutions.
Although more human connections can undoubtedly break down the
raced walls that separate us, relationships are no match for bias entrenched
in social institutions and legal doctrine. This focus on the workings of indi-
vidual minds in the context of addressing solutions problematically frames
racism as a matter of private concern, potentially leading readers to conclude
that racism lies beyond the reach of state and institutional remedies.76
Eberhardt’s suggestion regarding standard setting, however, reminds us
that law can be used to improve entire systems. Equality law in the United
States is currently defined by principles of anticlassification or “formal
equality.” A formal approach to equality suggests that the Constitution pre-
vents the government from assigning racial identity for differential treat-
ment. As such, state action that is facially neutral but imparts a racially
disparate impact is immune from challenge.77 In contrast, an antisubordina-
tion approach to equal protection focuses on the discriminatory effects of
state action rather than on the explicit intent of policymakers.78 This ap-
proach would subject to judicial review law and policy that reinforce or im-
part racial disadvantage.79 Alternately, a redistributive-justice model of equal
protection would impose on the state an affirmative obligation to dismantle
inequalities created by historical systems of domination; like an antisubordi-
74. CECILIA L. RIDGEWAY, STATUS: WHY IS IT EVERYWHERE? WHY DOES IT MATTER?
77, 130–35 (2019) (describing the interactional reproduction of status hierarchy).
75. Ford, supra note 21, at 1845.
76. Lawrence, supra note 63, at 942.
77. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkinization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1287–89 (2011). This interpretation has
subjected race-conscious policies meant to remediate racism and discrimination to typically
fatal strict scrutiny review. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–07 (2005) (holding that
both benign and invidious uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny).
78. Siegel, supra note 77, at 1288–89.
79. Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 1066–76 (analyzing the Reconstruction
Amendments to conclude, in part, that the Amendments redefined Blacks as citizens for whom
substantive, and not just formal, equality was needed).
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nation regime, redistributive justice operates without regard to intent.80 Un-
der both models, state policies with disparate racial impact, often the aggre-
gated manifestation of individual and unconscious biases, can be inter-
interrogated, improved, or avoided all together.
Consider, for example, criminal law. The Georgia death penalty at issue
in McCleskey v . Kemp might have been deemed unconstitutional under an
antisubordination approach to equal protection. Or, consider economic pol-
icy. Under a redistributive-justice approach to equality, the New Deal poli-
cies that excluded agricultural and domestic workers in the early twentieth
century might have been expanded to ensure Black Americans were not
again excluded from American wealth and prosperity. In fact, any number of
the state policies with racially disparate outcomes that Eberhardt canvasses
in her book, from the NYPD’s “stop and frisk” policies in Chapter Three
(pp. 63–64), to traffic stops in Chapter Five (pp. 101–06), to the legal rulings
that undercut school integration referenced in Chapter Eight (pp. 209–10),81
might be ended or assessed differently under an antisubordination or redis-
tributive justice approach to equal protection. Equality scholars have thus far
tilled only barren legal soil in pursuit of these more fruitful approaches. Nev-
ertheless, these models of equality are the more effective responses to uncon-
scious bias that goes unacknowledged and unaddressed in our current
cultural and legal environment.
These changes to equality doctrine are not the objective standards Eber-
hardt extols. And setting objective criteria for resume reviews may, in fact,
decrease the impact of unconscious bias on job candidates selected for inter-
views (p. 285). Many areas of American life, however, are regulated by sub-
jective standards rather than clear-cut rules, and for good reason. In the
criminal justice context, assessments of police use of lethal force are based on
whether officers believed such force to be “objectively reasonable” or “neces-
sary.”82 The problem is not that officers lack hard and fast rules for when
force is or is not reasonable. To the contrary, most civilians understand that
in dangerous situations, officers must rapidly consider many factors and
need latitude to make these split-second professional assessments. Rather,
the problem is that race too often skews both subjective and objective as-
80. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race”: The In-
version of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
615, 623.
81 . See, e .g ., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that absent interdistrict
segregation violations, a district cannot mandate government expenditures for plans that solic-
it voluntary interdistrict integration); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (giving federal
courts the authority to relinquish their supervision of desegregation in piecemeal fashion, even
if students never experience comprehensively integrated school systems); Bd. of Educ. v. Dow-
ell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (endorsing the termination of desegregation orders once school dis-
tricts become unitary, even if the consequences is resegregation); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974) (holding that absent an interdistrict violation, federal courts cannot order an inter-
district remedy).
82. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).
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sessments of what is reasonable or necessary. Similarly, discretion exists in
various stages of the criminal justice system. Again, the problem is not that
discretion exists, but that race too often dictates when that discretion is used
in service of severity or leniency.83 An antisubordination or redistributive
model for assessing racial disparities in these systems, however, would create
accountability for the way race operates, placing an affirmative obligation on
leaders and policymakers to make the system-wide cultural and operational
changes that can control for the impact of unconscious bias.
Take, for example, policing policies. Broken-windows policing focuses
on petty offenses and neighborhood disorder in low-income and minority
communities.84 This type of policing, which has only a modest impact on se-
rious crime, disproportionately subjects Black and brown people to arrests
for misdemeanors, summons for violations of administrative codes like bicy-
cling on the sidewalk, and potentially lethal police encounters.85 Similarly,
the War on Drugs, operating in tandem with stop and frisk or broken-
windows policing, results in disproportionate arrests of Black people for
drug-law violations, even though drug-use rates do not differ substantially
by race and ethnicity.86 Although rates of marijuana use between Blacks and
whites are comparable, in 2010 the ACLU found that Blacks were 3.7 times
more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession.87
If, as Eberhardt suggests, bias is triggered under conditions of ambiguity,
and some policies necessitate subjectivity, then our legal system would do
well to subject those policies to interrogation for racial disparities and, where
necessary, prompt replacement. In the state of California, lawmakers passed
legislation permitting police officers to use lethal force in response to a threat
“only when necessary in defense of human life,” a change from permitting
officers to use lethal force as an “objectively reasonable” response to a
threat.88 Although opinions differ on whether the change in standards went
83. KATHERINE J. ROSICH, AM. SOCIO. ASS’N, RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 10, 14–15 (2007), https://www.asanet.org/sites/default/files/savvy
/images/press/docs/pdf/ASARaceCrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LF5-8VK2] (referring to litera-
ture suggesting that police discretion results in higher arrest rates and harsher treatment at
arrest for minorities and that unfettered prosecutorial discretion to charge offenses has been
used with the effect of racial discrimination).
84. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighbor-
hood Safety, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1989, at 29), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive
/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/A5FD-SLD8].
85. SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON
CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA, AND RELATED
INTOLERANCE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4–5
(2018).
86. Drug users also generally purchase drugs from people of the same race or ethnicity,
thus undercutting counters that racial disparities in arrests are based on sale and distribution.
Id . at 3–4.
87 . Id .
88. Act of Aug. 19, 2019, ch. 170, 2019 Cal. Stat. 2500 (codified at CAL. PENAL CODE §§
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far enough,89 the new policy diminishes opportunities for potentially lethal
confrontations between police officers and Black civilians. An antisubordi-
nation approach to evaluating policing disparities by race can prompt
changes like these that better account for race, and not only in those regions
where the political stars align. Eberhardt applies her solutions in the context
of individual and company-level decisionmaking but avoids the logical ex-
tension of these solutions to larger social systems, instead falling back on
improving interpersonal interactions. That omission merits analysis in any
academic engagement with her work.
CONCLUSION
American discourse regarding bias must change, as a legal shift from
white innocence to white accountability can usher in cultural shifts that are
crucial for racial truth and reconciliation in the United States. Although
providing much-needed clarity on the brain science of unconscious bias,
some of Eberhardt’s framing nevertheless delays this shift. Bias may be un-
conscious, but people and institutions can be held accountable for their deci-
sions to act on it, or their failures to control for it. In this shift, it would be a
mistake to equate accountability with blame. Although our culture of taken-
for-granted white innocence is a problem, it is also true that assigning blame
will create the defensiveness that Eberhardt sought to avoid. The solution,
however, is not to suggest that the impact of all bias is the same or to focus
on addressing bias only in interpersonal interactions. Rather, political power
must be acknowledged, and system-wide solutions that can control for the
impact of unconscious bias adopted. And those solutions can only emerge
after accountability is established.90 Ultimately, we must lean away from
talking about unconscious bias as an uncontrollable problem between indi-
viduals, and toward understanding it as a set of structural problems that
dominant groups are responsible for dismantling. When unconscious bias
serves as a guide to where our cultural and legal systems need changing, we’ll
finally be able to reckon with its devastating impact.
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